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Reassessing Standing in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry: The Shareholder 
Derivative Suit as a Model for  
Public Interest Litigation 
William F. Kelly* 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 26, 2013, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down two controversial decisions on the issue of same-sex 
marriage. In one, United States v. Windsor, the Court struck 
down section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act—which 
provided that same-sex couples could not be recognized as 
spouses for purposes of federal law—as a violation of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.1 In the other, Hollingsworth 
v. Perry, the Court refused to hear a constitutional challenge to 
California’s Proposition 8—which amended the state constitution 
to define marriage as between a man and a woman—holding that 
the Proponents of the proposition did not have standing to defend 
the law in federal court.2 Although it was the first of the two 
cases that the Court adjudicated on the merits, it ultimately will 
be the latter that will have the more remarkable implications for 
American governance. Regardless of one’s opinion of the practical 
short-term results for same-sex marriage in California, the 
long-term consequences of the Court’s ruling will almost 
certainly undermine the democratic nature of state governments 
across the country.  
The Court’s refusal to hear the merits of the Hollingsworth 
case might initially appear to be inconsequential and constitute 
just another procedural ruling. After all, federal courts 
frequently refuse to hear cases on jurisdictional grounds. But—as 
this Comment will, in part, attempt to show—the circumstances 
in Hollingsworth are very different, and the decision, though 
procedural in nature, substantially undercuts the system of 
 
* J.D., Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law, May 2015. B.A., 
Cedarville University, 2012. I want to thank Professor John Eastman for his assistance in 
helping me research and write this Comment. 
 1 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
 2 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).  
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checks and balances inherent in the American system of 
government. In particular, it reveals a gaping hole in the Court’s 
doctrine of standing that, in effect, allows the executive branch of 
government to disregard the law without legal accountability.  
As will be shown in Parts I and II of this Comment, the 
Hollingsworth decision is very troubling to the extent that it 
allows executive officials to operate outside the confines of the 
law. No person—neither citizen, legislator, nor governor—is 
above the law, and the Court should not be interpreting the 
Constitution to allow such a result. To the extent that the result 
of Hollingsworth seems both a proper application of its recent 
standing doctrine (as will be shown in Part III) and yet 
nonetheless unacceptable as a matter of policy, the Court should 
find itself compelled to reconsider that precedent upon which its 
decision stands. Perhaps it is time to revisit the constitutional 
doctrine of standing altogether. It is certainly not without its 
critics.3 Or maybe the Court needs to reassess the line it draws 
between constitutional and prudential standing and be willing to 
recognize additional exceptions to some of its judicially conceived 
rules. Such exceptions are certainly not without precedent. Part 
IV of this Comment discusses the shareholder derivative suit as 
an important example of the Court making an exception to 
certain standing requirements in corporate law for purposes of 
furthering important policy objectives. It is therefore suggested 
that—just as the Court recognizes a standing exception in 
corporate law for the derivative suit—the Court should recognize 
an exception in the Hollingsworth scenario where it is not just an 
investor’s financial return at stake, but rather the rule of law 
itself. 
I. THE PROBLEM: THE BACKGROUND OF HOLLINGSWORTH 
In order to fully grasp the significance of the problem posed 
by the decision, it is important to understand the broader context 
of Hollingsworth and the extensive efforts made by the people of 
California to adopt a particular piece of legislation.4 Under 
article II, section 8 of the California state constitution, voters 
 
 3 Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable 
Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) (“[D]issatisfaction with the standing doctrine is not 
new, and has been expressed by many commentators.”); Heather Elliott, Congress’s 
Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L. REV. 159, 171 (2011) (describing the 
doctrine of standing as “confusing and unpredictable”); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is 
Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1775 (1999) (describing modern standing 
law as “extraordinarily complicated” and “impossible to defend as [a] plausible 
interpretation[] of the Constitution”). 
 4 For a summary of the background of Hollingsworth, see HENRY S. NOYES, THE 
LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY xxx–li (2014).  
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have reserved to themselves the right to an initiative process 
whereby they can adopt statutes and constitutional amendments 
through a direct vote by the people.5 In November 2000, eight 
years before Proposition 8, the California voters exercised this 
power and adopted Proposition 22 as a revision to the state 
family code.6 Entitled the California Defense of Marriage Act, 
this statutory amendment provided that “[o]nly marriage 
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”7 In 2004, however, Mayor Gavin Newsom ordered the 
City of San Francisco to begin issuing same-sex marriage licenses 
in violation of state law.8 This action marked the first instance in 
a series of disconcerting decisions whereby government officials 
acted in intentional dereliction of their duties to enforce the laws 
of the state. In a consolidated suit joining actions filed by both 
supporters of same-sex marriage seeking to overturn the statute 
and opponents seeking to enjoin the City of San Francisco from 
violating the law,9 the California superior court determined that 
the amended statute violated the California Constitution’s equal 
protection clause.10 In May 2008, after that case had worked its 
way through the court system, the California Supreme Court 
affirmed the superior court’s original ruling and held that 
 
 5 CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(a).  
 6 See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652 (2013).  
 7 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2014) declared unconstitutional by In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). 
 8 See Sylvia A. Law, Who Gets to Interpret the Constitution? The Case of Mayors and 
Marriage Equality, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L 1, 4 (2007). See generally In re Coordination 
Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 1550(c)], Marriage Cases, No. 4365, 2005 WL 583129 
(Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005). 
 9 Unlike in federal court, under California precedent, state courts will allow private 
“citizens who are not personally affected . . . [to] sue to compel performance of a public 
duty.” In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675, 690 (Ct. App. 2006); see also Green 
v. Obledo, 624 P.2d 256, 267 (Cal. 1981). But cf. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 573–74 (1992) (noting that the Supreme Court generally refuses, under the doctrine 
of standing, to allow federal courts to hear such cases). The California Supreme Court 
interestingly allowed the Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund to enjoin the 
City of San Francisco from violating the law but denied them standing to maintain a 
defense of the statute after temporary mandamus relief was granted. In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d at 406. The opponents of same-sex marriage could therefore compel the 
city to obey the law but could not defend the law itself in court as it was being challenged 
by same-sex couples. Because California Attorney General Bill Lockyer maintained a 
technical defense of the statute, however, there was no serious concern about standing for 
the case as a whole. In re Marriage Cases, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 718. Lockyer’s defense may 
be described as technical in the sense that he did make a constitutional defense of the 
statute, but he argued for a very narrow interpretation of it that would simply restrict the 
term “marriage” but not the concurrent rights to heterosexual couples. See id. 
Nevertheless, in an important sense, Lockyer fulfilled his duty as state attorney general 
to defend the law in court. This, at minimum, allowed other interested parties to 
intervene in the case where they could not in Hollingsworth. 
 10 In re Coordination Proceeding, 2005 WL 583129 at *8. 
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Proposition 22 violated the state constitution.11 Later that year in 
November 2008, in the very next election following the state 
court’s decision, a majority of California voters adopted 
Proposition 8, which essentially codified the language of 
Proposition 22 in the state constitution.12 This new constitutional 
amendment provided in article I, section 7.5 (immediately 
following the equal protection clause in section 7) that “[o]nly 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”13 Where Proposition 22 had previously only amended 
a statutory code, Proposition 8 amended the constitution. 
Consequently, the state court’s ruling that Proposition 22 
(Family Code section 308.5) violated the constitution no longer 
applied because the constitution itself now explicitly allowed for 
it. 
In November 2008, a day after the California voters had 
approved it, proponents of same-sex marriage filed suit 
challenging the constitutional validity of Proposition 8 even 
though it purported to amend the state constitution.14 Notably, 
though listed as a respondent and tasked with a defense of the 
law, California Attorney General Jerry Brown joined the 
petitioners in attacking the validity of Proposition 8. Not only 
was the Attorney General derelict in his duties to defend the law, 
but he also went out of his way to file a brief with the court 
attempting to undermine it.15 Although the California Supreme 
Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 8,16 
the Attorney General’s refusal to defend the law marked a second 
instance of serious abuse wherein state authorities refused to 
enforce the law.17 
After Proposition 8 survived this challenge under the 
California Constitution, two same-sex couples filed suit in federal 
district court alleging that the state constitutional amendment—
Proposition 8, that is—violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.18 
 
 11 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 453. 
 12 Cal. Proposition 8: 8 Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry 56 (2008), 
available at http://repository.uchastings.edu/ca_ballot_props/1288. 
 13 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 14 Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59, 61 (Cal. 2009).  
 15 See Attorney General’s Response to Amicus Curiae Briefs, Strauss, 207 P.3d 48 
(No. S168047), 2009 WL 853622. 
 16 Strauss, 207 P.3d at 61 (interpreting the newly amended article 1, section 7.5 very 
narrowly to require only that the official designation of “marriage” not be applied to the 
union of same-sex couples; same sex couples could still enjoy all the same substantive 
rights as an equal protection of the laws except the use of the term marriage).  
 17 The City of San Francisco is once again forthrightly identified as a petitioner in 
the case attacking the validity of Proposition 8. 
 18 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Perry 
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Seeking to bar enforcement of Proposition 8, the plaintiffs named 
as defendants California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and 
Attorney General Jerry Brown, among other local municipal 
authorities.19 However, herein lies the problem: though in fact 
named as the proper defendants in the suit, the Governor and 
Attorney General refused to defend the law in court. The 
district court itself recognized that “[w]ith the exception of the 
Attorney General, who concedes that Proposition 8 is 
unconstitutional, . . . the government defendants refused to take 
a position on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims and declined to 
defend Proposition 8.”20 The very same people charged with 
defending and enforcing the law under the California 
Constitution, refused to do so.21 Though they may have remained 
nominal defendants at trial out of legal necessity as a result of 
being named “defendants” in the plaintiffs’ complaint, it was the 
official proponents of the initiative (“Proponents”)22 who 
intervened to provide the actual defense of Proposition 8 in court. 
Ultimately, after a twelve-day bench trial, the federal district 
court held in favor of the plaintiffs and found that Proposition 8 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution.23 
Regardless of the substantive outcome, the official state 
defendants’ failure to defend the state’s constitution at trial 
 
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013). The Fourteenth Amendment states:  
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Although Proposition 22, Proposition 8, 
and the restriction of marriage to heterosexual couples was codified in the California 
State Constitution, it could still be found to violate the United States Constitution and 
thus be declared void. See id. art. VI (“Th[e] Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).  
 19 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928; see also Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, or 
Other Relief at 3, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. CV 09 2292 VRW), 2009 WL 1490740. 
 20 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928. Such an admission could also raise significant 
concerns about the requirement of adversity. See infra note 68. 
 21 CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The Governor shall see that the law is faithfully 
executed.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 13 (“It shall be the duty of the Attorney 
General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.”) 
(emphasis added); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 955.4(b) (West 2015) (“The Attorney General shall 
defend all actions on claims against the state.”). 
 22 The official proponents of an initiative are designated under CAL. ELEC. CODE 
§ 9001(a) (West 2015) pursuant to CAL CONST. art. II, § 8. In this case, the Proponents of 
Proposition 8 included Dennis Hollingsworth, Gail Knight, Martin Gutierrez, Hak-Shing 
Tam, Mark Jansson, and the organization they formed, ProtectMarriage.Com—Yes On 8, 
A Project of California Renewal. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 954.  
 23 Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003–04.  
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raised problematic concerns separate and apart from the 
standing problem that came up on appeal in Hollingsworth. 
Because the state officials necessarily remained defendants in 
the suit, the Proponents could legally intervene under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,24 but the time and expense of 
litigation alone might have deterred them from making such a 
defense.25 In such an event, the law would go unenforced and 
undefended even at trial, and the plaintiffs could theoretically 
have won by default.26 Even if parties do decide to intervene, it 
does not seem right that a private party should be required to 
defend a state law in court; that is specifically the purpose of 
government and the task of its elected state officials. It is wrong 
to require a private party to bear those litigation costs simply 
because the then governing officials disagree with it. It is a 
complete and utter deterioration of the rule of law. The only 
thing worse than requiring a private party to defend such a law27 
would be prohibiting that party from defending the law. Such is 
the premise of this Comment—that it would be a better option to 
permit a private party to litigate a defense of the law, than to 
allow the law to remain undefended altogether. Fortunately, this 
option was available to the Proponents of Proposition 8 at trial 
because the government officials were necessarily named as 
defendants in the complaint and could not simply withdraw from 
the case or cease to be parties to the action. The Proponents could 
therefore intervene in the matter.  
On appeal, however, the official defendants’ refusal to defend 
the law becomes much more problematic. Of course, at both trial 
and on appeal the defendants can—and did—refuse to 
participate in a strategic legal defense of the law. Unlike at trial, 
on appeal, the state officials can refuse to even remain party to 
the action; in other words, they can refuse to appeal the trial 
court’s ruling.28 As intervening defendants, the Proponents 
attempted to appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit, but, 
 
 24 FED. R. CIV. P. 24. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.  
 25 Ronald K.L. Collins & Robert M. Myers, The Public Interest Litigant in 
California: Observations on Taxpayers’ Actions, 10 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 329, 355 (1977) 
(indicating that the “time, effort, and potential expense of public interest litigation” will 
discourage private parties from intervening, and the “legal barriers in areas such as 
standing, remedial relief, and attorneys’ fees” might altogether prohibit it).  
 26 If the state officials refuse to defend the law—and private parties are either 
unable or unwilling to intervene—then the law would not be enforced and the legal 
transgressor would theoretically win in court by default. See FED. R. CIV. P. 55.  
 27 Of course, no private party is being compelled to defend the law; they could simply 
allow it to go unenforced, but that responsibility should not fall to private citizens.  
 28 See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660, 2667–68 (2013) (holding that 
defendant-interveners who do not meet the requirements of Article III standing cannot 
defend a state statute on appeal when state officials refuse to do so).  
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unfortunately, it is here that the problem of standing became a 
serious issue. Because the official state defendants named in the 
complaint decided not to appeal—for though they had technically 
lost the case and were thereby subjected to an injunction barring 
the enforcement of Proposition 8, they personally agreed with the 
lower court’s ruling—the Proponents had to establish 
independent standing.29 Professor Matthew Hall summarizes 
well how the situation changes from trial to appeal:  
Defendant’s standing took center stage only after entry of judgment, 
when the intervenor-defendants sought to appeal. After the district 
court entered judgment for plaintiffs, the government-official 
defendants took no action, but the intervenor-defendants sought 
appellate review. The Proposition 8 case thus squarely presented a 
potentially dispositive issue of defendant standing: namely, whether 
Article III permitted the sponsors of Proposition 8 to appeal after the 
government officials responsible for that law’s enforcement 
themselves declined to appeal the judgment below.30 
Before reaching the merits of the intervening defendants’ 
petition, the Ninth Circuit thus had to find that they had 
standing to maintain the appeal. In order to adequately address 
this issue, the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the California 
Supreme Court inquiring about the Proponents’ particular 
interest in and relationship to the proposition under state law.31 
The state court determined that the Proponents served as agents 
of the state and could therefore assert the state’s interest in 
defending the law.32 As a consequence, the Ninth Circuit found 
that the Proponents did have independent standing and could 
therefore maintain the appeal. On reaching the merits, however, 
it affirmed the lower court’s ruling and found that Proposition 8 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.33 
Frustrated yet again, the Proponents appealed the decision 
to the United States Supreme Court. In June 2013, the Supreme 
Court made a final determination of the issue, ruling that the 
Proponents did not have standing to appeal the case in federal 
court.34 The Court reasoned that the Proponents had not suffered 
 
 29 See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.  
 30 Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 
80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1563 (2012) (citations omitted).  
 31 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 32 Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1025 (Cal. 2011) (“Accordingly, we conclude that 
when the public officials who ordinarily defend a challenged measure decline to do so, 
article II, section 8 of the California Constitution and the applicable provisions of the 
Elections Code authorize the official proponents of an initiative measure to intervene or to 
participate as real parties in interest in a judicial proceeding to assert the state's interest 
in the initiative's validity and to appeal a judgment invalidating the measure.”).  
 33 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012).  
 34 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).  
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a personal individualized injury and consequently did not have a 
direct stake in the outcome of the case sufficient to confer Article 
III standing.35 Relying on precedent from Massachusetts 
v. Mellon and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Court 
determined that their complaint was nothing more than a 
general grievance which is shared in common with every other 
citizen and so did not qualify as an individualized injury.36 
Borrowing language from another case, the Court declared that 
the petitioners’ “asserted right to have the Government act in 
accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer 
jurisdiction on a federal court.”37 Upon this reasoning then, the 
Court summarily dismissed the possibility of having a citizen 
step in to defend the law.38  
It is the contention of this Comment that the Court should 
not have so quickly—if at all—dismissed as unconstitutional the 
idea of allowing a state citizen to defend a law when his or her 
state officials refuse to do so. Nowhere does the Constitution 
itself proscribe the raising of commonly held grievances or 
necessitate that a party assert a particularized injury. Although 
recently the Court has recognized these requirements as 
emanating from the Constitution, in reality, their origin was in 
prudential rather than constitutional doctrine.39 Thus, for the 
sake of a consistent application of the standing doctrine, as well 
as the substantial policy considerations discussed below, the 
Court should return to its original view that these are prudential 
limitations subject to exception in certain circumstances. As shall 
be shown in the remainder of this Comment, the Court should 
have affirmed such an exception in Hollingsworth. 
In the case itself, the Court went on to address the 
Proponents’ potentially unique interest as “Official Proponents” 
of the initiative under California law, as well as consider the 
possibility of their being agents of the state capable of asserting 
its rights and interests in the law; it found neither of those 
contentions persuasive and ultimately concluded that the 
Proponents, as intervening defendants, did not have standing to 
appeal.40 As a result, because the official state defendants 
refused to appeal the trial court’s decision and because the 
Proponents lacked standing, the Supreme Court vacated the 
 
 35 Id. at 2662.  
 36 Id. (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) and Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992)).  
 37 Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984)).  
 38 Id.  
 39 See infra note 84.  
 40 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662–68. 
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Ninth Circuit’s ruling and dismissed the case, leaving only the 
collusive judgment of the district court in place.41  
II. THE PROBLEM: UNCORRECTED ABUSE AND THE  
LITIGATION VETO 
As a result of the Court’s decision in Hollingsworth, the 
State of California is now left with only a federal district court 
injunction that—with no binding precedential effect42—purports 
to enjoin state officials from enforcing section 7.5 of the 
California Constitution.43 For the same reason that they refused 
to defend the law in court—namely, they disagreed with it—the 
Governor and Attorney General advised all county clerks to 
comply with the district court’s injunction and issue same-sex 
marriage licenses from that point forward.44 Therefore, because 
the very same state officials constitutionally charged with 
administering the law failed to defend the law in court, a duly 
enacted constitutional amendment is being undermined and 
ignored by the state government.45 Again, regardless of one’s 
pragmatic assessment of the Hollingsworth outcome, that these 
officials could forthrightly disobey the law, without the people of 
California having legal recourse or being able to hold their 
representatives legally accountable, should be very disconcerting. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the state adopted the initiative 
system for the express purpose of placing additional political 
control and governmental checks in the hands of the people,46 the 
Court’s decision ultimately did nothing less than allow state 
 
 41 Id. at 2668.  
 42 See Benjamin G. Shatz, Gimme 5: What Every Lawyer Should Know about Stare 
Decisis, L.A. COUNTY B. ASS’N. (Apr. 2008), http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?page 
id=9375 (“[T]he decisions of district courts generally have no binding precedential 
effect.”); see also Stephanie Condon, Prop. 8 Judges Chide Schwarzenegger, Brown for Not 
Defending Law, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:25 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/prop-8-
judges-chide-schwarzenegger-brown-for-not-defending-law/ (noting that the plaintiff’s 
counsel conceded to the Ninth Circuit that the district court’s “ruling may only technically 
apply to the two counties where the plaintiffs filed suit”).  
 43 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Perry 
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013). 
 44 Letter from Kamala D. Harris, Cal. Attorney Gen., to Edmund G. Brown Jr., Cal. 
Governor 1 (June 3, 2013), available at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AG_Letter.pdf; see also 
Letter from Tony Agurto, Cal. Assistant Deputy Dir. of Health Info. and Strategic 
Planning, to Cnty. Clerks and Cnty. Recorders (June 26, 2013), available at http://gov.ca. 
gov/docs/Letter_to_County_Officials.pdf; Governor Brown Issues Statement on Historic 
Proposition 8 Ruling, CA.GOV (June 26, 2013), http://gov.ca.gov/news.php? id=18111.  
 45 CAL. CONST. art. V, § 1 (“The Governor shall see that the law is faithfully 
executed.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 13 (“It shall be the duty of the Attorney 
General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 46 Statewide Initiative Guide 2013/2014, CAL. SEC’Y STATE, https://www.sos.ca.gov/ 
elections/ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-guide.pdf.  
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officials to circumvent the law. Ninth Circuit Judge Randy 
Smith—who, along with the other judges serving on the appellate 
court, found that the Proponents did have standing47—explained 
the problem posed by the state officials’ refusal to defend or 
appeal:  
[T]he governor’s action and the attorney general’s actions have 
essentially nullified the considerable efforts on behalf of the initiative 
to be placed on the ballot and obtain passage. . . . We have an attorney 
general and a governor with no ability to nullify the acts of the people, 
and then by not appealing they, in fact, do it.48 
Although the Governor does have the authority to veto a bill 
passed by the legislature, he or she does not have the power to 
nullify a voter-approved initiative, an existing law previously 
codified, or an amendment to the constitution.49 Neither does the 
Attorney General have any such power.50 Although it can be 
argued that they have discretion in enforcing the law, such 
discretion simply cannot be allowed to reach to such executive 
nonfeasance as is evident in the Hollingsworth case.51 Yet, in 
effect, by refusing to defend the law in court, these are exactly 
the powers the California Governor and Attorney General are 
assuming. Colorado Attorney General John Suthers writes that 
“[s]ome attorneys general are wielding the litigation veto for the 
same reasons a governor might wield a constitutional veto: [t]hey 
strongly disagree with the law. But in contrast to the president 
or a governor, there is no constitutional authority for this 
litigation veto.”52  
The state officials’ refusal to defend Proposition 8 is certainly 
dubious as a matter of law, but beyond the questions of mere 
legality are much broader policy concerns. Suthers continues to 
describe the long-term consequences of such a systematic abuse 
of the state’s executive power: 
Recently, . . . attorneys general in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and 
California have given in to the temptation to abuse the power 
entrusted to our position by refusing to defend their states’ bans on 
same-sex marriage in court. Depending on one’s view of the laws in 
 
 47 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2012) (Smith, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), vacated, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 48 Condon, supra note 42.  
 49 CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 10(a). 
 50 See id. art. V, § 13.  
 51 See John W. Suthers, A ‘Veto’ Attorneys General Shouldn’t Wield, WASH. POST 
(Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-veto-attorneys-general-should 
nt-wield/2014/02/02/64082fc8-887e-11e3-a5bd-844629433ba3_story.html (indicating that 
an attorney general has discretion and may even in good faith not defend a law when 
binding precedent is “clear” and “unavoidable,” but “[t]hat’s not yet the case with state 
laws banning same-sex marriage”).  
 52 Id.  
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question, such a “litigation veto” may, in the short term, be a terrific 
thing; an unpopular law is defanged and the attorney general can take 
credit—indeed, he can be the hero to his political base and keep his 
political ambitions intact. But in the longer term, this practice 
corrodes our system of checks and balances, public belief in the power 
of democracy and ultimately the moral and legal authority on which 
attorneys general must depend.53 
As Suthers points out, the problem of this litigation veto is not 
just confined to California. Rather, the Court’s decision in 
Hollingsworth has set precedent and sent a message to other 
states’ executives that they are legally unaccountable for the 
intentional refusal to perform their official governing duties.54 As 
a result, in addition to California, at least six other state 
attorneys general in Kentucky,55 Oregon,56 Nevada,57 Virginia,58 
 
 53 Id. at 51. Cf. Andrew DeMillo, Arkansas Attorney General Supports Gay Marriage, 
but Will Defend State’s Ban, HUFF. POST (May 3, 2014, 11:36 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/03/arkansas-gay-marriage_n_5259683.html 
(indicating that though he personally opposes his state’s ban on same-sex marriage, 
Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel will nevertheless “zealously defend” his 
state’s constitution).  
 54 Hollingsworth, of course, strictly speaking does not say they are legally 
unaccountable altogether, but merely restricts standing in federal courts. As a result, 
however, acquiring a judicial remedy for such a violation becomes much more difficult as 
the Hollingsworth case demonstrates. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that 
executive officials such as the Governor and the Attorney General are still politically 
accountable and can be voted out of office either at the end of their term or through a 
special recall election. See CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 13–14. Nevertheless, at the same time, 
political accountability can be quite unresponsive to particular abuses. See Collins 
& Myers, supra note 25, at 331 (“The net result is that the slow, cumbersome, and 
sometimes unresponsive electoral process remains the only realistic federal forum 
available to taxpayers to check legislative and executive abuses.”) (citation omitted); 
Taxpayers’ Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895, 910 (1960) (“The need for 
[public interest litigation] arises from the absence of alternative means of correcting 
illegal practices of government officials which would otherwise be irreparable. One 
alternative to taxpayers’ suits is, of course, the elective process itself, but the electorate 
may ignore corruption, illegality, or unconstitutionality which occurred early in the term 
or which is relatively less eye-catching than the overall record of those in power; elections 
present package alternatives, often only two in number, and the voters are disabled from 
expressing their views on each governmental act.”) (citation omitted). But see United 
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“Slow, cumbersome, and unresponsive 
though the traditional electoral process may be thought at times, our system provides for 
changing members of the political branches when dissatisfied citizens convince a 
sufficient number of their fellow electors that elected representatives are delinquent in 
performing duties committed to them.”).  
 55 See Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (holding that the 
state’s ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional); see also Brett Barrouquere, 
Kentucky Gay Marriage Recognition Put on Hold by Federal Judge, HUFF. POST (Mar. 19, 
2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/19/kentucky-gay-marriage_n_499 
5364.html (indicating that the Kentucky Attorney General Jack Conway will not appeal 
the district court’s ruling but that Governor Steve Beshear will step in to appeal by 
appointing outside counsel).  
 56 See Complaint, Rummell v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014) (No. 
6:13-cv-02256-MC); Oregon Won’t Defend Gay Marriage Ban in Lawsuit, USA TODAY (Feb. 
21, 2014, 12:44 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/02/21/oregon-gay-
marriage-ban/5669719/ (stating that Oregon’s Attorney General will not defend the state’s 
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Pennsylvania,59 and Illinois60 have all refused to defend their 
states’ laws—not to mention the federal executives’ own failure to 
defend the Defense of Marriage Act.61 The corrosive abuse to 
which Suthers alludes is not taking any time in eating away at 
our system of democracy. Although the Supreme Court had an 
opportunity to begin correcting this abuse in Hollingsworth, its 
ultimate decision to proscribe the Proponents from litigating a 
defense of the law only served to exacerbate the problem and 
allow state executives to flaunt the abdication of their official 
duties. 
Ultimately, the problem exhibited in Hollingsworth is not 
just that the Court was unwilling to allow the Proponents of the 
initiative to defend the law—though that would have certainly 
helped solve the problem in this and other cases concerning the 
enforcement of voter ballot-initiatives. Rather, the Court’s 
decision exemplifies a much broader problem with the standing 
doctrine as a whole that prevents citizens as a class from holding 
their government accountable to the law through the judiciary, 
 
ban on same-sex marriage).  
 57 See Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Nev. 2012) (finding that the 
state’s ban on same-sex marriage was not unconstitutional); Nevada Drops Defense of 
State’s Same-Sex Marriage Ban, FOX NEWS (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/2014/02/10/nevada-drops-defense-state-same-sex-marriage-ban/ (citing the 
Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval and Attorney General Catherine Masto to claim that 
they won’t defend the state’s gay marriage ban on appeal).  
 58 See Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014) (finding that the state’s 
ban on same-sex marriage violates the federal constitution); Steve Szkotak, Virginia 
Attorney General Says Gay Marriage Ban is Unconstitutional and Will Not Defend It, 
HUFF. POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 7:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/23/ virginia-
gay-marriage_n_4650584.html (indicating Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring won’t 
defend the state’s ban on same-sex unions and will “join the fight against it”).  
 59 See Complaint, Palladino v. Corbett, No. 2:13-cv-05641-MAM (2013), 2014 WL 
830046 (challenging Pennsylvania’s ban on same-sex marriage); Juliet Eilperin, Pa. 
Attorney General Says She Won’t Defend State’s Gay Marriage Ban, WASH. POST 
(July 11, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/07/11/sources- 
pa-attorney-general-wont-defend-states-gay-marriage-ban/ (citing Pennsylvania Attorney 
General Kathleen Kane as announcing that she will not defend the state’s ban on 
same-sex marriage).  
 60 See Gray v. Orr, 4 F. Supp. 3d 984 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (granting a temporary 
restraining order that prohibits a county clerk from enforcing the state’s same-sex 
marriage ban). It is interesting to note that the court allowed state Attorney General Lisa 
Madigan to be assigned as a plaintiff in the case. Tammy Webber, Illinois Gay 
Marriage: State Prosecutors Refuse to Defend Gay Marriage Ban, HUFF. POST (Aug. 21, 
2012, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/21/illinois-gay-marriage-sta_0_n 
_1615170.html (indicating Madigan won’t defend the state’s same-sex marriage ban in 
court).  
 61 See Niraj Chokshi, Seven Attorneys General Won’t Defend Their Own State’s 
Gay-Marriage Bans, WASH. POST (Feb. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ 
govbeat/wp/2014/02/20/six-attorneys-general-wont-defend-their-own-states-gay-marriage-
bans/; see also Holder Gives Nod to State AGs to Drop Defense of Gay Marriage Bans amid 
Court Challenges, FOX NEWS (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/02/25/ 
holder-gives-nod-to-state-ags-to-drop-defense-gay-marriage-bans-amid-court/.  
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which was set up and envisioned by the Founder’s 
separation-of-powers design to operate as a check on the political 
branches. Even if the Court had found the Proponents had 
standing to defend their initiative, what would the Court have 
done if it had been a typical legislatively adopted statute? Or a 
constitutional amendment via a legislative convention rather 
than ballot initiative?62 Or even an initiative where its 
proponents subsequently refused to defend the law due to 
litigation costs? Perhaps, it could be argued, the legislative 
representatives would be the appropriate parties to defend a law 
in court in the event the executive branch shirks its duties. But 
the Court has been reluctant to extend standing to a legislator 
who bases his or her claim on nothing more than an institutional 
injury to the legislature as a whole.63 Furthermore, in the case of 
an initiative adopted by the people rather than the legislature, it 
seems that no individual representative would be in any better 
position to establish standing than would an ordinary citizen. 
Consequently, legislators would likely face many of the same 
hurdles to showing injury as did the Proponents in 
Hollingsworth.64 Based on the Court’s ruling, it is difficult to 
envision just what kind of party, if any, would have standing to 
defend the law in Hollingsworth. The other contention is that no 
party should have standing to defend the law other than those 
officials specifically charged with that duty—namely, the 
governor, the attorney general, and other subsidiary executives.65 
The only remedy in such a case would then be political: to vote 
those state officials out of office and replace them with persons 
who would enforce the law. But the political process is not always 
sufficiently responsive or capable of correcting such instances of 
corruption.66 Does the Court really intend to deny legal 
accountability for state executive nonfeasance? Based on the 
 
 62 See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.  
 63 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821–26 (1997); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 433, 438 (1939) (finding certain circumstances that a legislator could bring a claim 
when he had a “plain, direct and adequate interest” in the case).  
 64 See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Although appellant’s 
status as a legislator introduces somewhat unique considerations into the case at bar, we 
must bear in mind that there are no special standards to be employed in analyzing 
legislator standing questions.”); see also S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 743–46 (2013) 
(summarizing the doctrine of standing for Members of Congress and stating that a 
congressional representative “along with every other person attempting to invoke the aid 
of a federal court, must show ‘injury in fact’ as a predicate to standing”). But see Hall, 
supra note 30, at 1545–51 (explaining how the rules of standing might apply uniquely to 
legislative representatives).  
 65 Although the Court did not say as much in Hollingsworth, it seems to be the 
inevitable result of the Court’s final ruling: if the official proponents of a law do not have 
standing, then who else besides the attorney general would?  
 66 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
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Court’s current doctrine of standing, and its prohibition of 
generalized grievances as applied in Hollingsworth, this, 
unfortunately, seems to be the conclusion at which the Court has 
arrived, and its consequences are only just beginning to be 
realized. 
III. THE CAUSE: THE STANDING DOCTRINE AND THE 
PARTICULARIZED INJURY REQUIREMENT 
The Court’s decision in Hollingsworth to deny the 
Proponents the right to appeal ultimately flowed from its 
doctrine of standing. The doctrine in essence functions as a 
principle of separation of powers by limiting those cases that can 
be brought before a federal court. It is supposedly derived from 
the case or controversy requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the 
United States Constitution, which the Court has interpreted to 
limit federal judicial jurisdiction to “actual controversies arising 
between adverse litigants.”67 Therefore, if the plaintiff and 
defendant do not have actual adverse interests in a case, the 
Court will simply dismiss it for lack of Article III standing.68 In 
order for there to be the requisite adversity, each litigant must 
have “a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.”69  
The Hollingsworth case presents a unique twist on the 
typical application of the standing doctrine to the extent that it 
was being applied to an intervening defending party, rather than 
a plaintiff. In the vast majority of federal cases, questions of 
standing are concerned, as a practical matter, solely with the 
nature of a plaintiff’s claim.70 The plaintiff is the one who has or 
will imminently suffer an injury, and so he or she is the one 
seeking redress in court. Standing is rarely an issue for 
defendants because they almost always unquestionably have it. 
The threat of an imminent adverse judgment exposes the 
defendant to an injury and, thus, confers standing upon him.71 If 
 
 67 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . [or] 
Controversies.”); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911). 
 68 Sometimes adversity and standing are treated as separate elements required 
under Article III, but as the Court stated in Baker v. Carr, “the gist of the question of 
standing” is whether the parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of 
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
 69 Id. 
 70 See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) 
(“To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing.”) 
(emphasis added); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (“[T]he standing question is 
whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy’ . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 71 See Hall, supra note 30, at 1552. 
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it does not, however, then that destroys standing—for the 
adversity element of Article III implies that standing must be 
satisfied by both parties lest there not be an actual controversy.72 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to require of the defendant, as 
much as of the plaintiff, that standing be satisfied. Hollingsworth 
also presents a unique situation in light of the fact that the 
Proponents were intervening parties to the original action; they 
were not named in the plaintiffs’ original complaint but rather 
sought to intervene under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.73 The Court has indicated that when the original 
parties to the action have standing, any intervening parties need 
only satisfy the requirements specifically laid out in Rule 24; 
they are not required to independently meet the constitutional 
standing requirements of Article III so long as the original 
parties do.74 If, however, the original parties lose their standing 
or fall out of the case, then any intervening parties who wish to 
maintain suit would need to independently satisfy those 
requirements. This is why, when the original defendants (the 
state officials) refused to appeal the unfavorable district court 
ruling, the Proponents were required by the Court to 
demonstrate independent Article III standing in order to 
maintain a defense of the case on appeal. As a result, because the 
parties in question are intervening defendants, Hollingsworth 
presents a unique approach to the question of standing; it is hard 
to imagine a scenario much different than that of Hollingsworth 
where an intervening defendant’s standing is genuinely in 
question.75 The general idea of applying the requirements of 
standing to an intervening defendant who wishes to make an 
independent appeal nevertheless seems appropriate, even if the 
particular criteria applied were inappropriate, as this Comment 
contends was the case in Hollingsworth. The only question the 
Court faces then concerns to whom exactly it should apply those 
criteria. The Proponents argued—and the Ninth Circuit found—
that they should be applied to the State of California because the 
Proponents were representing the state in the suit. Because the 
state certainly has standing to defend its own laws in court, so 
 
 72 Id. at 1551 (“The terms ‘case’ and ‘controversy,’ in their nature, presuppose a 
dispute with interested parties on both sides; indeed, it makes little sense even to speak of 
a case or controversy with only one interested party.”) (citations omitted); see also 
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997).  
 73 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (laying out the requirements of intervention).  
 74 Intervention is governed by Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
the Court has determined that intervening parties need not independently establish the 
elements of standing when they are met by the original plaintiff(s) and defendant(s). 
See id.; see also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64 (1986). 
 75 For a similar situation, see Diamond, 476 U.S. at 57–59 (where a doctor sought to 
intervene in defense of an Illinois abortion statute).  
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too does its authorized representative—whether that is the 
Attorney General or the Proponents of the proposition. The 
Supreme Court, however, ultimately rejected this approach, 
reasoning that even if they represent the interests of the state, 
the Proponents must still independently satisfy the requirements 
of standing.76 Assuming that the Court got this right and that the 
Proponents themselves must independently satisfy the 
requirements of standing, the Hollingsworth decision still 
exposes a real analytical problem with the doctrine. 
The doctrine of standing is traditionally divided into two 
categories: namely, constitutional requirements, which the Court 
has interpreted to impose certain essential unalterable demands 
of the constitution, and prudential limitations, which tend to be 
more flexible and subject to the requirements of the situation and 
the laws of Congress.77 The Court has indicated that the three 
basic prerequisites of constitutional standing require that: (1) the 
party has suffered an injury; (2) the injury is caused by the 
conduct complained of in court; and (3) the injury is remediable 
by the court.78 Although none of these elements are precisely at 
issue in Hollingsworth, the Court has developed a correlated 
requirement to the first element necessitating that the injury be 
“particularized” and that it “affect the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.”79 Spelled out and applied, this principle 
basically prevents litigants from raising generalized grievances 
common to the public at large. Reasoning that certain matters of 
widespread concern are better addressed through the political 
branches of government, the Court has held this element to 
prohibit citizens from attempting to vindicate public rights in 
federal court. In Federal Elections Commission v. Akins, for 
instance, the Court explained that “the political process, rather 
than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate 
remedy” for resolving general complaints about the 
government.80 Likewise, in Warth v. Seldin, the Court declared 
that “other governmental institutions may be more competent to 
 
 76 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013) (“But even when we have 
allowed litigants to assert the interests of others, the litigants themselves still ‘must have 
suffered an injury in fact.’”).  
 77 See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 737 (2013). 
 78 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (“[O]ur cases have 
established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three 
elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . . Second, there 
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third, 
it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by 
a favorable decision.’”).  
 79 Id. at 560 n.1.  
 80 Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998).  
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address” such questions of “wide public significance.”81 In Lujan, 
the Court reiterated the principle stating that:  
 We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a generally 
available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and 
every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and 
laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits 
him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case 
or controversy.82 
Thus, a broad bar on generalized grievances has been maintained 
under the auspices of the Court’s standing doctrine. However, 
where the Court had previously found this requirement to be a 
prudential limitation more readily subject to exceptions,83 the 
Court has more recently recognized it as an unalterable maxim of 
Article III standing.84 It is this new—though erroneous—
interpretation that seems to necessitate the result of 
Hollingsworth. If the Court rather were to have reaffirmed these 
requirements as prudential limitations, as it has in the past, 
then it could have excepted the Proponents in Hollingsworth 
from the general rule, allowed them to make their case in defense 
of the law, and prevented the abusive implications of the 
litigation veto.  
Because it recognized these requirements as constitutional, 
however, the Court bound its own hands and was unable to make 
an exception for the Proponents’ appeal. Finding that “[t]heir 
 
 81 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); see also Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S 208, 221–22 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (“[T]he absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these 
claims gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the 
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.”); Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (“[G]eneralized grievances [are] more appropriately addressed in the 
representative branches.”). Again, as seen in the Hollingsworth case, the political process 
was not sufficient because of the executive officials’ failure to enforce the law. It is 
therefore worthwhile to contrast the Court’s policy reasoning in Mellon and Akins with 
the policy implications of the Hollingsworth decision. Such consideration should provoke a 
serious reconsideration of the Court’s prohibition of generalized grievances.  
 82 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74; see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 754 (“[A]n asserted right to 
have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to 
confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (“[W]hen the asserted 
harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large 
class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.”).  
 83 See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 737 (2013) (“[I]t is clear that the Court feels free to 
disregard any of these prudential rules when it sees fit.”).  
 84 Although it has settled recently on classifying the requirement as a constitutional 
mandate, the Court had previously, though inconsistently, identified it as a prudential 
limit. See S. DOC. NO. 112-9, at 726; see also, e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500 
(prudential); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United, 454 U.S. 464, 485, 490 (1982) 
(seemingly constitutional); Allen, 468 U.S. at 751 (prudential); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575 
(constitutional). And most recently in Hollingsworth, the Court cited Lujan with approval 
and recognized the element as a constitutional requirement. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 
S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013). 
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only interest in having the District Court order reversed was to 
vindicate the constitutional validity of a generally applicable 
California law,” the Court summarily determined that they could 
not satisfy the particularized injury requirement.85 As a 
consequence, it held that they had raised nothing more than a 
generalized grievance and could not maintain the suit. It is not so 
much that the Court lacked precedent; in point of fact, the Court 
held very strictly to its most recent decisions even in the face of 
its severe adverse implications. Rather, the severity of those 
policy implications (following from the legal unaccountability of 
state executives) should have prompted the Court to more 
seriously consider its application of that precedent to the case at 
hand. In Flast v. Cohen, for instance, the Court lowered the 
barrier to allow taxpayers to challenge the constitutionality of 
congressional taxation or spending—apparently recognizing the 
particularized injury requirement as a prudential limitation.86 
Flast, however, did not create an open-ended license for citizens 
to bring suits against the government; rather, the Court set two 
strict criteria to protect this new taxpayer suit from abuse. First, 
the taxpayer can only challenge congressional action arising 
under the Taxing and Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution.87 
Second, the taxpayer must allege that the taxing or spending 
power violates a specific constitutional limitation.88 By cracking 
open the door to such suits, the Court recognized the importance 
of having a judicial remedy available to keep government taxing 
and spending accountable to the constitution. On the other hand, 
by prescribing strict limitations for the suit, the Court was also 
able to prevent abuse of such suits. 
Another instance where the Court seemingly allows 
exception to the particularized injury requirement comes up in 
shareholder derivative actions. As will be shown further in Part 
IV, federal courts have allowed shareholders to bring derivative 
claims on behalf of their corporation despite the fact that their 
injury is shared in common with a great many other 
shareholders. Many of the same purposes and policies that have 
allowed these cases to proceed in federal court notwithstanding 
the lack of a particularized injury should prompt the Court to 
reconsider its decision in Hollingsworth and allow citizens in 
certain circumstances to bring suit against—or, as the case may 
be, on behalf of—the government. 
The taxpayer and the derivative suit exceptions both 
 
 85 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.  
 86 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).  
 87 Id.; U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 88 Flast, 392 U.S. at 102–03.  
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indicate that the requirement of a particularized injury is really 
only a matter of prudential standing. If the Court genuinely 
believed that the requirement flowed from a constitutional 
mandate, then no statute or precedent to the contrary could 
consistently permit such exceptions. Rather, the Court has and 
continues to allow these exceptions in recognition of certain great 
policy concerns. Whatever the proper classification of the 
particularized injury requirement—whether prudential, as it was 
in the past, or constitutional, as it is currently formulated—the 
Court clearly makes exceptions to it and should seriously 
consider doing so for cases like Hollingsworth. 
IV. THE SOLUTION: THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT AS A 
MODEL EXCEPTION 
The theory of a shareholder derivative action is in principle 
not very different from the idea of a public interest citizen suit. 
But where the Court has recognized and affirmed the former, it 
has generally rejected the latter for lack of standing. Derivative 
suits to be sure are subject to strict limitations and procedures to 
prevent their abuse as they rightly should be,89 but unlike citizen 
suits they are not proscribed altogether from being brought in 
federal court. Despite the lack of a particularized injury to any 
one shareholder that is differentiable from that suffered by every 
other shareholder, the Court continues to recognize the 
importance of making an exception to that requirement in order 
to allow shareholders access to a judicial remedy that can hold 
management accountable and enforce the rights of the 
corporation. In this way, the derivative suit exemplifies the 
Court’s own willingness to lower the bar on standing in certain 
circumstances. In the same manner then, it is here proposed 
that—subject to rational limitations and requirements to prevent 
abuse—citizens should be entitled to hold their government 
accountable to the law and bring their grievances before a court 
of law even if they allege nothing more than a common and 
widespread injury.  
In essence, the derivative suit is the right of a shareholder to 
assert a right or claim on behalf of the corporation.90 Under 
business law, a properly formed corporation is a discrete legal 
entity subject to its own rights and liabilities, which are 
ordinarily distinct from that of its shareholding owners.91 In a 
 
 89 See infra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.  
 90 Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) (“A shareholder derivative suit is a 
uniquely equitable remedy in which a shareholder asserts on behalf of a corporation a 
claim belonging not to the shareholder, but to the corporation.”).  
 91 Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come With Responsibilities: Personal Jurisdiction in 
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typical corporate paradigm, shareholders vote to elect a board of 
directors who in turn appoint executive officers to manage the 
affairs of the corporation. Therefore, not unlike a republican form 
of government, although shareholders own the business and may 
elect their representatives on the board, they do not control or 
dictate the day-to-day business decisions of the company. Thus, 
operational decisions—including the right to bring suit on behalf 
of the corporation—normally fall within the discretion of 
corporate management.92 However, in certain circumstances, the 
directors and officers may refuse to bring a suit that they 
otherwise rightly should in the best interests of the company. For 
example, the directors might be guilty of fraud, self-dealing, 
mismanagement, negligence, waste of corporate assets or of 
acting on some other personal interest that conflicts with the 
interests of the corporation. Or they might simply have acted 
ultra vires—that is, in excess of their authorized authority under 
either state law or the corporation’s charter and bylaws.93 In 
whichever of these instances, those persons responsible for 
managing the corporation will be unlikely to direct the company 
to file suit against themselves.94 In theory, if shareholders 
disagreed with the directors’ decisions, they could vote them out 
of office and elect new directors who would appoint new officers 
who would bring the suit and enforce the company’s legal rights. 
In practice, however, the Court has found that shareholder 
voting is simply insufficient as a mechanism of corporate 
managerial accountability.95 Consequently, the Court extended a 
judicial remedy to shareholders by allowing them to step in and 
represent the corporation’s legal interests through derivative 
proceedings. For this reason, the Court acknowledged, the 
 
the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125, 131 (2013).  
 92 Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge 
Settlements in Class Actions and Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REV. 81, 100 (1998) 
(“Under the basic corporate law paradigm, shareholders, as owners of the corporation, 
elect directors to manage the corporation on the shareholders’ behalf and to make 
decisions affecting the corporation, including the decision to initiate litigation.”). 
 93 Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality 
(With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1279, 1307 (2001) (“A shareholder could bring a derivative action on behalf of the 
corporation to recover damages suffered from an ultra vires transaction.”). 
 94 Gregory P. Williams & Evan O. Williford, Derivative Litigation: Fundamental 
Concepts and Recent Developments, in 2005 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS AND 
CORPORATE LITIGATION 444, 448 (2005), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/ 
newsletter/0039/materials/pp5.pdf. 
 95 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547–48 (1949) (“The vast 
aggregate of funds committed to corporate control came to be drawn to a considerable 
extent from numerous and scattered holders of small interests. The director was not 
subject to an effective accountability. . . . This remedy born of stockholder helplessness was 
long the chief regulator of corporate management and has afforded no small incentive to 
avoid at least grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders’ interests.”) (emphasis added). 
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purpose of the “derivative action was to place in the hands of the 
individual shareholder a means to protect the interests of the 
corporation from misfeasance and malfeasance of ‘faithless 
directors and managers.’”96 As an owner of the business, the 
shareholder’s purpose in protecting the corporation is to protect 
his or her own financial investment, although that is a 
generalized injury that the individual shareholder shares with 
all other shareholders. Even though the shareholder suffers no 
particularized injury, the Court permits this kind of derivative 
action when management exceeds its authority under the 
corporation’s constitution—that is, its charter and bylaws.  
Ordinarily shareholders would lack standing as individuals 
to bring suit because of the absence of a particularized injury. 
The only injury the shareholder suffers is derivative of the harm 
done to the company and thus shared in common with all of the 
other stockholders.97 If the shareholder did suffer a personal, 
individualized injury, then there would be no need for derivative 
proceedings; that individual could just bring a personal claim 
against the company.98 For example, if the shareholder suffered a 
loss of voting rights due to a corporate reorganization, that 
shareholder would suffer a personal and particularized injury 
because it was him or her who was entitled to those voting rights 
as opposed to the corporation.99 In that case, the shareholder 
could sue the corporation and the directors directly rather than 
derivatively on behalf of the corporation. In contrast, the 
derivative suit is meant to cover injuries to the corporation that 
harm all the shareholders through their equity interests in the 
company. As Richard Epstein points out, the “derivative action is 
meant to cover cases where no particular shareholders 
have . . . suffered any special injury at all.”100 For many large 
publicly-traded companies, a derivative claim would run into 
many of the same concerns that the Court has expressed relating 
to plaintiffs who raise generalized grievances about 
government—namely that such grievances would be better 
addressed through electoral procedures and voting processes. As 
noted above, such processes are not always sufficient to hold 
management accountable.101 Therefore, because the shareholder 
lacks particularized injury and raises little more than a 
 
 96 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) (citing Beneficial 
Indus., 337 U.S. at 548).  
 97 Kim, supra note 92, at 102–03. 
 98 See id. (noting that sometimes it can be difficult to discern between a direct and 
derivative injury/claim); see also Williams & Williford, supra note 94, at 449–52.  
 99 See Eisenberg v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1971).  
 100 Epstein, supra note 3, at 26. 
 101 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
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widely-shared grievance about corporate management, the 
derivative suit ordinarily could not satisfy general standing 
requirements.  
In light of weighty policy considerations, however, the 
Supreme Court created an exception to the particularized injury 
requirement for the derivative suit. In Cohen v. Beneficial 
Industrial Loan Corp., the Court explained: 
Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no standing to 
bring civil action at law against faithless directors and managers. 
Equity, however, allowed him to step into the corporation’s shoes and 
to seek in its right the restitution he could not demand on his 
own. . . . [W]hen, as was usual, those who perpetrated the wrongs also 
were able to obstruct any remedy, equity would hear and adjudge the 
corporation’s cause through its stockholder. . . . This remedy born of 
stockholder helplessness was long the chief regulator of corporate 
management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least 
grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders’ interest. It is argued, and 
not without reason, that without it there would be little practical 
check on such abuses.102 
Born in equity and later codified in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a shareholder bringing a derivative suit, therefore, 
need not satisfy all of the requirements of standing.103 
Furthermore, that the Court has allowed shareholder suits to 
avoid the particularized injury requirement indicates that this 
specific requirement is merely prudential: for while states can 
alter prudential limitations, constitutional limitations are in 
theory fixed and unchangeable. A different standard is allotted 
for derivative suits under the federal rules requiring only that 
(1) the plaintiff be a shareholder in the corporation and (2) the 
plaintiff fairly and adequately represent the interests of other 
similarly situated shareholders in enforcing the rights of the 
corporation.104 These less exacting standing requirements stand 
in contrast to the elements normally required to satisfy standing. 
The Court is thus willing to set aside certain limitations in the 
interest of maintaining strong corporate managerial 
accountability.  
Rather than broadly prohibiting derivative actions, federal 
courts have opened wide the class of eligible 
plaintiff-shareholders who can bring the suit. Of course, 
recognizing the dangers arising from abuse of such derivative 
 
 102 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (emphasis added). 
 103 Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 238 (5th Cir. 1983).  
 104 FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.41 (2005); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 14A:3-6.2 (West 2015).  
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proceedings (often called “strike suits”),105 the Court has allowed 
the institution of certain other preconditions on plaintiffs who 
wish to bring such actions against their company and directors. 
One such condition often requires that the plaintiff post expenses 
to cover the corporation’s legal fees in the event that the 
shareholder loses the case.106 Another condition usually 
necessitates that—prior to bringing suit—the shareholder must 
make a demand upon the corporation and directors to properly 
file the suit or else the shareholder must meet a high burden of 
showing that such a demand would be futile.107 These two 
conditions thereby act as guardians of the derivative action in 
order to prevent the abuse of the suit and extortion of 
management for settlement value. Even these conditions, 
however, do not constrain the class of eligible plaintiffs but 
simply require that they clear certain hurdles to demonstrate the 
legitimacy of their suit.  
Given the importance the Court attaches to maintaining 
corporate accountability, as illustrated by the creation of a 
standing exception for the derivative suit, is it really 
unreasonable for the Proponents and the citizens of California to 
ask the Court to recognize a corresponding exception for them to 
hold their state executives accountable to the law? Their plight is 
certainly not beyond comparison to that of the shareholders. In 
both cases, executive management is refusing to sustain a 
lawsuit that it rightly should. Comparable to corporate directors’ 
and officers’ refusal to institute a suit, the Governor and 
Attorney General in Hollingsworth refused to defend a state law 
 
 105 For a discussion of strike suits, see William M. Lafferty & W. Leighton Lord III, 
Towards a Relaxed Summary Judgment Standard for the Delaware Court of Chancery: A 
New Weapon Against “Strike” Suits, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 921, 924 (1990).  
 106 For an example of such a requirement, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6.8 (West 
2015) (“In any derivative proceeding or shareholder class action instituted by a 
shareholder or shareholders holding less than 5% of the outstanding shares of any class or 
series of the corporation, unless the shares have a market value in excess of $250,000, the 
corporation in whose right the action is brought shall be entitled at any time before final 
judgment to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses, 
including fees of attorneys, that may be incurred by it in connection with the action or 
may be incurred by other parties named as defendant for which it may become legally 
liable.”). For further analysis of “Security for Expense” statutes, see John B. Lieberman 
III, Corporations – Stockholders’ Suit - State Security for Expenses Statute Is Inapplicable 
in Stockholders’ Derivative Suit in Federal Court for Violation of Securities Exchange Act 
Provision and Regulation Thereunder, 7 VILL. L. REV. 292, 292–94 (1962). 
 107 For an example of such a demand requirement, see MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.42 
(2005) (“No shareholder may commence a derivative proceeding until: (1) a written 
demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and (2) 90 days have 
expired from the date the demand was made unless the shareholder has earlier been 
notified that the demand has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable injury 
to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.”). For a 
broader analysis and discussion of the requirement, see Williams & Williford, supra note 
94, at 452–89.  
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and then to appeal the unfavorable district court ruling.108 In 
both cases, the electoral power of voting is insufficient to hold 
those officials accountable. The Court clearly stated as much of 
the corporate scheme in Cohen, and there are good reasons for 
thinking that is equally true of the state.109 In both cases, the 
parties are seeking a judicial remedy to enforce the rights of their 
respective state and corporate organizations. Where the 
shareholder seeks to file suit on behalf of the business, the 
citizen-Proponents in Hollingsworth sought to appeal the suit on 
behalf of the state. And, most relevantly, in both cases the 
parties lack a direct particularized injury. The injury to the 
shareholders arises from the harm caused to the corporation and 
is shared in common with all of the stockholders while the 
citizen-Proponents’ injury arises from harm caused to the state 
that is shared in common by all its citizens.110 Yet, in one 
instance, the Court was willing to create an exception to the 
requirements of standing while in the other it refused to grant 
any such exception. This inconsistency highlights the weighty 
countervailing policy considerations that the Court simply 
refused to address in Hollingsworth.111  
CONCLUSION 
Perhaps there are concerns about the separation of 
governmental powers and even questions of federalism in 
Hollingsworth that are not present in the derivative suit, but 
that by no means obviates the necessity of having legal 
accountability for the executive branches of government. Ever 
since Marbury v. Madison, it has been the Court’s role to 
interpret the law and check the constitutional boundaries of the 
other branches of government.112 For this reason, Richard 
Epstein notes that the doctrine of standing “operates at cross 
purposes with the function of judicial review.”113 Marbury on the 
one hand empowers courts to review the actions of coordinate 
branches of government while Mellon and its standing prodigy 
have limited that power. The doctrine of standing therefore 
becomes a matter of balancing the dangers of federal judicial 
activism with the dangers of executive and legislative abdication. 
Hollingsworth illustrates the latter and the Court’s concurrent 
failure to check the exercise of that power. As illustrated by the 
 
 108 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2660 (2013).  
 109 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
 110 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661.  
 111 See supra Parts I–II.  
 112 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
 113 Epstein, supra note 3, at 2. 
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shareholder derivative suit, it would not have been beyond the 
Court’s reasonable power to recognize a limited exception to the 
prudential doctrines of standing in order to remedy such an 
executive abuse. That the Court wished to avoid deciding the 
merits of such a controversial case is perhaps understandable, 
but its refusal to adjudicate the matter on grounds of standing is 
not so excusable. To the extent that it allows executive state 
officials to disregard the law without appropriate legal 
accountability, the Court’s decision to abdicate that responsibility 
may turn out to be far more controversial and damaging than 
any adjudication on the merits could possibly have been.  
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